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The Latest Developments in Article 9*
Ms. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, Mr. Mark Leipold &
Ms. Margit Livingston
MS. HILLINGER: Good afternoon. Our topic is Latest Develop-
ments in Article 9. Revised Article 9 is going to be three years old in
July. It is a little too young to predict what it is going to be like as a
grownup, but I think we can make two generalizations at least in its
toddler-hood. First, it is going to work well for corporations, limited
liability companies, and Wall Street deals. It is not going to work so
well for general partnerships, individuals, and deals that Cousin Vinny
puts together. Second, Revised Article 9 states two very different sets
of rules. One set governs conflicts between the Article 9 secured
party and another Article 9 secured party or a buyer. A second set of
rules governs the conflict between the Article 9 secured party and a
lien creditor, in particular, the bankruptcy trustee. In that gun fight at
OK Corral at high noon, Article 9 does its very best to make sure the
bankruptcy trustee is the one facing the blinding sun with no gun in its
holster.
Now, we obviously have a limited period of time for discussion this
afternoon. We are going to hit on a few issues that we think are hot
and interesting.
Professor Maggie Livingston wrote an article entitled, Survey of
Cases Decided under Revised Article 9.1 Maggie identifies and ad-
dresses all Revised Article 9 cases through the middle of 2003. It is a
terrific article. The article contains a clear analysis of the case law. If
you want to get the low-down on the Article 9 case law in the space of
an hour, I strongly recommend that you read that article.
The next source of Revised Article 9 case law is a website main-
tained by Professor Keith Rowley at the University of Nevada-Las
Vegas. That website lists all cases decided under Revised Article 9 or
mentioning Revised Article 9. The website briefly summarizes each
case. It, too, is very helpful.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPosIUM, Emerging Trends in Commercial Law: Surviving
Tomorrow's Challenges, held on April 15, 2004.
1. Margit Livingston, Survey of Cases Decided Under Revised Article 9: There's Not Much
New Under the Sun, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L. J. 47 (2003).
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This afternoon, we want to call your attention to cases of interest.
Mark and I want to conduct this last session as a conversation.
We are lucky enough to have Professor Livingston in the audience,
and we want to invite her sua sponte to join us. We invite all of you to
ask questions.
We are going to start with the debtor's name for purposes of the
financing statement. Section 9-502(a)(1) says that a financing state-
ment is sufficient only if it provides the name of the debtor. Going a
little further into the Code, section 9-503 expands on the requirement
of the debtor's name. Section 9-503 distinguishes between a regis-
tered organization and other debtors. For a registered organization,
the name must be the name indicated on the public record of the
debtor's jurisdiction of organization. So the rule for registered organi-
zations is pretty easy. The debtor's name is the name that is on the
record in the jurisdiction in which the debtor organized.
For debtors who are individuals or non-registered organizations,
section 9-503(a)(4) says: "a financing statement sufficiently provides
the name of the debtor.., only if it provides the individual or organi-
zational name of the debtor." It does not tell us what an individual
debtor's name is. It does not say the financing statement must give
the debtor's correct name. It does not say the financing statement
must give the debtor's full name. It does not say the financing state-
ment must give the debtor's legal name. It just says the financing
statement must give the debtor's individual name, if the debtor is an
individual, or the debtor's organizational name, if the debtor is an
organization.
Section 9-521(a) provides a suggested sample national standard
UCC-1 form. Above the block for the debtor's name, it says, in larger
font, "DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME." In the space
for individual debtor names, the form has a space for last name, first
name, middle name, and suffix.
Those are the statutory requirements concerning the debtor's name
on a financing statement. Section 9-506 states the test for the suffi-
ciency of a financing statement. A financing statement is seriously
misleading, and, therefore, ineffective, if it fails to provide the name of
the debtor in accordance with section 9-503 unless a search of the
records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the
filing office's standard search logic, would disclose a financing
statement.
The question is, what is the debtor's name for purposes of a valid
financing statement, or, when will a filed financing statement be effec-
tive? Maggie and Mark. Would you like to talk about the case law?
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MR. LEIPOLD: It is easy. I just get the exact legal name off the
debtor's birth certificate.
MS. HILLINGER: Maggie?
MS. LIVINGSTON: It is a little more complicated. We have a
couple of cases coming out of bankruptcy courts in Kansas in which
individuals were debtors, and the filing secured party used a nick-
name. One involved a debtor named Michael Erwin, and the name on
the financing statement was Mike Erwin.2 The other involved a
debtor named Terrance Kinderknecht, and the name on the financing
statement was Terry Kinderknecht. 3 In both cases, when the debtors
went into bankruptcy, the court held that the use of the nickname on
the financing statement was adequate.
MR. LEIPOLD: So now I have to look under nicknames? Those
are easy nicknames. What if it is a less obvious nickname?
MS. LIVINGSTON: It could be a problem. I think what the courts
are doing is they are going back to the reasonably diligent searcher
standard that had existed before Revised Article 9 went into effect.
The courts are saying that searchers have to search as if something
really depended on it. So they cannot just plug in the debtor's name
on a driver's license or the name on a Social Security card and be
done with it. They have to think about names that the debtor might
be commonly using and use those as well because that is what you do
if you are conducting a serious search. If you really want to find
something in the public records, you will use common variations of
the debtor's name.
MR. LEIPOLD: Well, I guess I thought the whole purpose of Re-
vised Article 9 was to require an exact name so that I would only need
to look at the organizational documents. Now, you are telling me I
have got to go back to the old ways and come up with a bunch of
different names to make sure I have covered my bases, or to rely on
the case law? This does not make much sense.
MS. LIVINGSTON: I think that is right. For registered organiza-
tions, the statute says to use the name of the organization that is the
official registered name. But it does not say that for individuals or for
non-registered organizations. So is the implication that the drafters
wanted to create more leeway?
MR. LEIPOLD: Maybe there was not a real concern about individ-
ual debtors, which is what many of us deal with. I can not speak for
2. Nazar v. Bucklin Nat'l Bank (In re Erwin), No. 02-10227, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 692 (Bankr.
D. Kan. June 27, 2003).
3. Clark v. Deere & Co. (In re Kinderknecht), 300 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003), rev'd 308
B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
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the audience. So my question is, what is a diligent search? How many
variations should I come up with?
In the Erwin case, the judge suggested you could search under "Ir-
win." Well, that might be easy, that might be a relatively small in-
crease in my research results, but how about "Smith?" Do I have to
look at "Smith" and every variation on the first initial? I mean, how
many pages of searches do I have to go through to be reasonable?
MS. LIVINGSTON: We are not told. Part of the problem also is
that different states, and some of you may have encountered this,
maintain different databases for their financing statements. So you
have an official Secretary of State database, but then you will have
unofficial databases too. Sometimes the Secretary of State itself is
maintaining both an official database and an unofficial database.
There are also searches you can do on Westlaw and Lexis, which are
controlled by different search parameters. So I do not know where we
are left because section 9-506 of the Code talks about doing a search
under the debtor's correct name using the filing office's standard
search logic. That search logic is going to vary a lot from state to state.
If you have a national practice, you are going to have to become
aware of the search logic in every individual state.
MS. HILLINGER: If I might add too, in the second case coming
out of Kansas, dealing with an individual, the debtor's name was Ter-
rance Kinderknecht. It was a bankruptcy case. Mr. Kinderknecht had
signed his bankruptcy petition "Terry Kinderknecht." The court said
a reasonable search required the bankruptcy trustee to search under
the name under which the debtor signed the petition.
MR. LEIPOLD: Which is one of the questions that I, as a bank-
ruptcy trustee, have to ask: "What names do you go by? What are all
of your aliases? What is your maiden name?"
MS. HILLINGER: What happens if the debtor does not file
bankruptcy?
MS. LIVINGSTON: Why should it make a difference what name
the debtor used on the bankruptcy petition?
MS. HILLINGER: (to the audience) How do you all search? Do
you search? Does anybody here search? No one searches? Your
practices all intersect with Bankruptcy, do they not? No one here has
done a search?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I search as broadly as I can.
MS. HILLINGER: Why do you do that?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Just in case.
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MS. HILLINGER: What happens if you find something under the
nickname "Butch?" Do you tell your client not to go forward with the
loan?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It depends specifically on the facts. It
would cause me at least to ask the question whether it is possible that
this financing statement that says "Butch" is good or not good.
MS. HILLINGER: How do you know?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I do not know.
MR. LEIPOLD: We are getting paid to sort of protect the home
front at the beginning, not at the end of the day. What is troubling is
if you come across the financing statement on a new loan, there has
been some representation on the documents that your loan is going to
be the first priority loan. If I come across a financing statement that I
did not know about, the first thought that pops into my head is fraud.
I am getting taken, and my client is probably getting taken because
there is this errant financing statement.
MS. HILLINGER: So it is in the searcher's best interest to find out
in the beginning whether the debtor is lying and not to go through the
loan?
MS. LIVINGSTON: So if the debtor is giving his name differently
to different people, does that raise questions about the debtor's
honesty?
MR. LEIPOLD: Obviously it depends on the facts, but you pre-
sumably have some representation that there are no other financing
statements. Or there may be a representation that there may be fi-
nancing statements out there, but all the loans have been paid off.
The financing statements just stay in place for a period of time. It is
sort of the "drawer theory" of financing statements.
In fact, I am hoping that the debtor gives me the detail or the infor-
mation so I can actually source that financing statement. Recently, I
have had situations where the only way I could find the financing
statement was by having the number of the previously filed financing
statement.
Speaking as a bankruptcy lawyer, I would say that the first question
always revolves around fraud. The next question is why did I not
know about this going into it? In order to manage client expecta-
tions, I do not want to be surprised. If I am surprised, my first re-
sponse is pretty reactionary. I am convinced that something is going
on if I am not told.
MR. NIMMER: The real issue is not the one you are talking about,
but the other side. That is, how badly do you have to have done a
2004]
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filing before you lose in bankruptcy? It is not a question of what you
search for, but how you file. If I use the word "Terry" rather than
"Terrance," am I at risk? This is a different issue from searching.
MS. HILLINGER: Do you think there should be different rules
depending on whether it is tested in bankruptcy or outside
bankruptcy?
MR. NIMMER: Yes. I suspect if you ever had a case in which the
real issue is searching by a real creditor, you might very well get a
different outcome. I think the Bankruptcy Court is looking at a differ-
ent issue. They are basically asking if this guy has it so badly wrong
that I should throw him out of court? It is a different issue.
MR. LEIPOLD: From many judges' perspective, the issue is not so
much "did they get it wrong," but "is there some way I can carve out
something for the unsecured creditors." That is a motivation. Re-
member, that was the history under old Article 9.
MR. NIMMER: Yes, but those two courts could have easily said
"Terry" is not "Terrance," so, therefore, it is invalid. However, they
did not say this.
MS. HILLINGER: That is right.
MR. NIMMER: So they really were asking a different question.
MS. LIVINGSTON: I think part of the issue is that the trustee is
not a reliance creditor. In other words, the trustee did not lend
against the debtor's assets based on having viewed information in the
public files. One thing that the three of us have talked about is
whether Article 9 should be amended to say that unperfected security
interests stand up against lien creditors. This would ease the burden
on filing creditors who get things wrong on the financing statement
because they would still survive in bankruptcy. However, you would
lose your priority against later purchasers or later secured parties who
actually relied on the public records.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I will do the search or have the search
done, and then I will pay extra to have the Secretary of State, the only
filing place in Connecticut, do its own search. Then, I will give them
all sorts of possibilities: in the case of "Smith," three or four spellings;
in the case of "Erwin," with an "i" or with an "e". I will pay the
Secretary of State and get a certificate from them. If they screw up, I
have at least covered myself with the lenders I am searching for by
doing my own search.
MS. HILLINGER: That is interesting too, because in the two Kan-
sas cases we are talking about, it was possible to get a certified report
from the Kansas Secretary of State's Office by giving them certain
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names to search or one could do one's own search using Access Kan-
sas. The court in Kinderknecht said that searchers should be using
Access Kansas to search, even though they could get a certified report
from the Secretary of State that would show certain results. The
searcher should go the extra mile and use Access Kansas because it is
more flexible and accepts greater parameters within the search logic.
MR. LEIPOLD: Does Article 9 say I only really have to look at the
official report?
MS. LIVINGSTON: It does.
MS. HILLINGER: Who cares?
MS. LIVINGSTON: There is a comment to Article 9, section 9-506,
which says a financing statement that is seriously misleading is ineffec-
tive even if it is disclosed by 1) using a search logic other than that of
the filing office to search the official records, or 2) using the filing
office's standard search logic to search a database other than that of
the filing office. The comment is pretty clear in saying we do not ex-
pect you to be using unorthodox search methods or unofficial
databases. You have a right to enter a name into the official Secretary
of State's database and see what that produces.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do many of the search sites allow you to
put in partial names or to put in initials and things like that? Would
the official search logic allow you to put in "Kinderknecht" and the
initial "T" as the first name?
MS. HILLINGER: Yes.
MS. LIVINGSTON: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So based upon the fact the Code does
not require an individual's "full exact legal name," it seems to me that
"Terry" is a name that would be found using the standard search logic.
MS. HILLINGER: There are two questions. First, what a prudent,
risk-averse attorney does when representing a creditor? Second, what
courts do given what the law says. Let me change the situation to a
deal with a search involving a corporate name. We have a case involv-
ing a name change when an individual sole proprietorship became a
corporation. 4 The original filed financing statement said something
like "Randy A. Vincent d/b/a Summit Staffing." However, the actual
corporate name was "Summit Staffing of Polk County, Inc." The
court said the filed financing statement under "Randy A. Vincent
d/b/a Summit Staffing" was effective. The filed financing statement
remained effective despite the change.
4. In re Summit Staffing Polk County, Inc., 305 B.R. 347 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
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Now, could someone find the filed financing statement searching
under the new debtor's name? No. Why then was the filed financing
statement effective? According to the court, a searcher has a duty to
use reasonable diligence in examining the search results. So even
though a search under the registered organization name did not reveal
the filed financing statement, the searcher had an obligation to look at
the search results and see if the name was somewhere on a previous or
subsequent screen.
MR. LEIPOLD: I think there are really a couple of points on that.
One is how extensive your search should be. I think the court in Sum-
mit sort of talks about it as an alphabetical index. You theoretically
could go through the entire alphabet looking for this name, but at
some point, it becomes unreasonable. The question always is how far
you should look.
I think the other component is that access to online filing informa-
tion will become available on your PC at your desk. In some situa-
tions, in some states, you submit the name, you get results, and you
get the one name. Eventually, you will be able to do your own search
because the official search will be online. You will be able to access
the official system for a price and do the search right then and there.
Rather than blaming the Secretary of State's office because they did
not go back far enough, the onus would be upon you as the practi-
tioner to decide how far you are going to look. Do you look at all of
the names which start with "S?" Some of these other names are going
to be pretty common. "Summit" may be easier.
MS. HILLINGER: It seems to me the question is who has the bur-
den. Should the searcher have the burden to undertake multiple
searches? Or, should the filer have the responsibility to get the
debtor's name right?
Now, we forgot to talk about the Michigan district court case, In re
Spearing Tool and Mfg Co.,5 which is the only court that we know of
that has gone the other way.
MR. LEIPOLD: It was a Federal Tax Lien Act case. The lower
court had decided that the secured creditor should have looked under
"Spearing Tool and Mfg" because the IRS had filed its tax lien using
"Mfg" rather than "Manufacturing." Having reached that conclusion,
the bankruptcy court decided in favor of the IRS. The district court's
opinion is a little different. The district court concluded that you
should only have to do what is reasonable, which is the $64,000 ques-
tion. Article 9 says you should search under the exact legal name of
5. Crestmark Bank v. IRS (In re Spearing Tool and Mfg. Co.), 292 B.R. 579 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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the organization. Therefore, the inference is that it is somehow not
reasonable to look for "Mfg," even though it was used by the IRS.
I think the result is somewhat helpful. As a practitioner, I cannot
interpret this case to mean that I can just rely on a search of the
debtor's exact legal name because I know there are courts out there
that require searches of abbreviations. Also, since this is really a tax
lien case, not an Article 9 case, I am not sure it is fair to say what is
reasonable to look for in a tax lien search is what a search pursuant to
Article 9 would require.
MS. HILLINGER: Except that the district court did say that it
judges how you search for a federal tax lien using the most modern
and enlightened approach in terms of commercial behavior and in this
environment, that is Revised Article 9.
MR. LEIPOLD: But under old Article 9, I would have looked
under "Mfg."
MS. HILLINGER: That is right. The court was talking about a
rigid computerized search. The court said that a searcher could only
use the Michigan Secretary of State's Office to search, because indi-
viduals do not have access to the database. Thus, a searcher has the
right to rely on the one search, a search under the debtor's exact legal
name as it was recorded in the debtor's Articles of Incorporation.
MR. LEIPOLD: I do not expect the IRS to change its policies for
how it files lien claims any time soon. I think we will always poten-
tially face that issue. If you are in a jurisdiction where you can look at
a broader capacity of names, then the question maybe is what is rea-
sonable. In this case, I should have picked up the IRS lien.
MS. HILLINGER: Also, we should note the case involved a real
creditor who was making advances and checking periodically for tax
liens; it had searched under the exact legal name of the debtor, found
nothing, continued to make advances, and was harmed. Nevertheless,
the bankruptcy court said the tax lien was valid.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you see how this could develop over
a few years? Those of us who are going to be extra cautious will
actually search more broadly, even though the statute only requires a
search of the exact registered name. Sooner or later, more judges are
going to ask what people really do and we are going to have to say we
search broadly. The judges will eventually say if that is what a reason-
able person does, then that is how we will interpret it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is a reasonable search test only applied
to individuals, or is it also applied to corporations? If it applies to
corporations as well, is there a conflict?
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MS. HILLINGER: Well, the statute evaluates the sufficiency of the
debtor's name by testing it according to a search under the debtor's
name. You have to go back to section 9-503 to find out what the
debtor's name is. The debtor's name is going to be different depend-
ing on whether the debtor is a registered organization or something
else. If you do a search under the debtor's name, as defined or not
defined, and you uncover the financing statement, it is effective even
though the financing statement did not give the "debtor's name."
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But the first section says for it to be ef-
fective, you have to use the exact name.
MS. HILLINGER: That is right only for registered organizations.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If you use the exact name, how does the
second section create an exception? Even though we may find the
statement, it is not under that name. The first section says you have to
use the exact name.
MS. LIVINGSTON: I always thought there was a little bit of a
fudge factor in section 9-506(b) which says, except as provided in (c),
a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the
debtor in accordance with section 9-503(a) is seriously misleading.
Then the statute goes on to talk about searching under the debtor's
correct name. I always thought that if courts wanted to give the filing
creditor some wiggle room, they would go back to section 9-506(b)
and say a financing statement actually did provide the name of the
debtor even if the name provided was not the debtor's exact legal
name. So we do not even get to see whether you are running a search.
We are going to say it is okay because, according to the way we view
section 9-503, you did sufficiently provide the name of the debtor.
MS. HILLINGER: The Code does not tell us what is the legal
name or the correct name for an individual or a non-registered organi-
zation. As the Revisors liberalized everything else to make the world
safe for secured parties, they said the next killing field would be the
debtor's name because they had really tightened the screws on that
requirement. I am not sure whether that is true.
Let me go on to the next topic, which involves a commercial tort
claim or general intangible, and proceeds. The case In re Wiersma6 is
a story about electrocuted and shocked cows. A dairy farmer hired
someone to provide electrical services on his farm. Apparently, the
electrical services were faulty. Many of the debtor's cows were elec-
trocuted. Milk production went way down, and the farmer filed
bankruptcy.
6. 283 B.R. 294 (Bank. D. Idaho 2002).
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The debtor-farmer had a secured creditor. The creditor had a per-
fected security interest his cows and milk and his general intangibles.
The bankruptcy trustee argued that the debtor's cause of action
against the electrical supplier was a commercial tort claim. Because
the creditor's security agreement did not create a security interest in
the debtor's commercial tort claim, the creditor did not have an inter-
est in it. Any recovery would therefore go to the bankruptcy estate.
The creditor argued that the cause of action was not a commercial tort
claim but a general intangible. The court said the definition of com-
mercial tort claim is a claim that arises in tort. The court then said
that the real question was when does a claim arise in tort? Although
there was no case law under Article 9, there was a lot of case law on a
related issue. There is an Idaho statute that says the attorney for the
prevailing side in a contract claim can get attorneys' fees. According
to that case law, a claim arises in contract if the contract is integral to
the claim. Even if the plaintiff is suing for negligence, fraud, con-
sumer protection, the source of the problem derives from the contract.
The claim arises in contract. The claim does not arise in tort. The
court in Wiersma said, but for the contract with this electrical supplier,
there would have been no claim. Therefore, the claim arose in con-
tract, not in tort. Therefore, it was a general intangible, the creditor
was perfected, and the proceeds went first to satisfy the secured credi-
tor's claim.
MR. LEIPOLD: Are PIK payments proceeds under Revised Arti-
cle 9?
MS. HILLINGER: That is unclear. In Stallings,7 the debtor farmer
grew sugar beets. The government had been doing some spraying.
Some of the spray blew over onto the debtor's land and destroyed his
beet crop. The debtor filed bankruptcy. After the petition was filed,
the government created a program to reimburse farmers for their
losses.
There were two questions in the case. First, were these government
payments property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate? Second, did the
creditor, who had a security interest in the debtor's crops and general
intangibles, have a claim to those payments? What would you say in
terms of whether the payments were property of the debtor-farmer's
estate? The program authorizing the payments did not exist until af-
ter the debtor filed bankruptcy. The court said the debtor's right to
reimbursement for his crop loss was not property of his estate. The
debtor did not have a property interest at the commencement of the
7. In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (Bankr. Idaho 2003).
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case. At most, the debtor had an expectancy. If a debtor does not
have a property interest as of the commencement of his case,
whatever it is does not become property of the estate.
What about the creditor's claim to payments? Did it have a security
interest in them? First, section 552(a) invalidates after-acquired prop-
erty clauses in bankruptcy. The property here-the debtor's right to
payment-only came into existence postpetition. Therefore, the cred-
itor's interest in the debtor's current and after-acquired general in-
tangibles would not attach to this postpetition right to payment.
Was the debtor's postpetition right to reimbursement proceeds?
This court said it might have concluded it was proceeds had it been
able to decide the issue on a clean slate but, given that circuit's prece-
dent, it was not proceeds. Paying for a crop that was not produced is
not proceeds of the crop.
Now, other courts will come to different conclusions. I am sure
many of you are aware of PIK payment and payment-in-kind pro-
grams. Under former Article 9, some courts concluded they were pro-
ceeds of crops and therefore subject to the crop lender's security
interest. Others held they were not. It seems that issue continues
under Revised Article 9 despite its significantly expanded definition of
proceeds.
When reading In re Goncalvez,8 I realized how stark the difference
is between perfection and priority under Revised Article 9. Revised
Article 9 states two very different sets of rules: one set for the contest
between Article 9 secured creditor and the bankruptcy trustee-lien
creditor, and another for the Article 9 secured creditor in conflict
with claimants other than the bankruptcy trustee.
In Goncalvez, you had a debtor who bought a car in New York.
The creditor had a security interest, which lien it duly noted on the
certificate of title ("COT"). The debtor moved to Ohio and received
a new, clean certificate of title. The creditor never did anything. Two
months later, the debtor filed bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee
argued:
The debtor is now in Ohio. There is a new certificate of title is-
sued by Ohio. The COT does not note the creditor's lien. There
has been a change in the law. Ohio law now controls. The creditor
is not perfected. The creditor's interest is therefore avoidable.
First, the parties both thought old Article 9 applied. The court said,
"No, Revised Article 9 applies." The general rule I have gleaned from
the cases is the date the bankruptcy petition is filed determines
8. 291 B.R. 441 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003).
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whether old Article 9 or Revised Article 9 applies. So, if the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed after the effective date of Revised Article 9,
then Revised Article 9 applies. It seems all of the courts are in agree-
ment on that. Because the debtor had filed bankruptcy after Revised
Article 9's effective date, Revised Article 9 controlled.
Second, the opinion ruled on the trustee's motion for summary
judgment. It did not get into much substance.
Anyway, the court said that getting a COT from a new state means
there is a change in the governing law, but that does not necessarily
mean the creditor loses its perfection. Section 9-316(d) says a credi-
tor's interest remains effective unless the issuing state says perfection
lapses. When does an issuing state's law say a creditor's perfection
lapses? And if it says nothing, the creditor's perfection continues on
and on, even though no one has notice of its interest.
MS. LIVINGSTON: One of the comments to section 9-316 talks
about the possibility that state A's certificate of title law could provide
that once the state A certificate is surrendered in state B, it ceases to
be effective. You could have that type of situation.
MR. LEIPOLD: That assumes the lender does not hold onto the
COT. The lender is presumably holding on to it.
MS. LIVINGSTON: So it is going to be a rare case where the cer-
tificate is actually surrendered.
MS. HILLINGER: The last issue I want to talk about is the Lewis9
case from the Eleventh Circuit. Lewis says a creditor's prepetition
repossession of a car, even though the creditor does not sell it pre-
petition, basically divests the debtor of any meaningful ownership in-
terest in the car. Therefore, the car was not property of the Chapter
13 debtor's bankruptcy estate, and the debtor could not get the car
back. The Eleventh Circuit used Alabama conversion law to reach its
conclusion. It never mentioned Article 9. That is okay, even though
Article 9 controlled. The issue was tested again in Florida and went
all the way back up to the Eleventh Circuit.10 In that case, the Elev-
enth Circuit used Florida's certificate of title statute to hold the credi-
tor owned the car when it repossessed it. Therefore, the only right the
debtor had at the commencement of his bankruptcy case was the right
to redeem under Article 9. The Chapter 13 debtor could not simply
pay the present value of the creditor's secured claim and some amount
on the deficiency claim.
9. Charles R. Hall Motors v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).
10. Bell-Tel. Fed. Credit Union v. Kalter (In re Kalter), 292 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
2004]
688 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Recently, there was a bankruptcy court decision in Georgia that
said Lewis was based on Alabama conversion law.11 The Florida case
was based on Florida's certificate of title law. The court wanted to
base its decision on Article 9 law. And, under Article 9, a debtor re-
tains an ownership interest if the collateral has not been sold prepeti-
tion. That decision is presently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit has certified the question to the Georgia Su-
preme Court.
Meanwhile, other cases in other jurisdictions have taken different
positions. For example, in Oklahoma, a prepetition seizure does not
divest the debtor of ownership, and the debtor has the right to redeem
according to the Chapter 13 rules.12
MR. LEIPOLD: I thought the Lewis issue was decided by Whiting
Pools 13 in the early Eighties? I thought this all got resolved. I thought
Whiting Pools said, if some rights remain when the debtor goes into
bankruptcy, the debtor has the ability to acquire a turnover order and
bring the collateral back into the estate?
MS. HILLINGER: You remember right, Mark. This is how the
Eleventh Circuit gets around Whiting Pools. Federal law, of course,
trumps state law. Whiting Pools is federal law. But, the Supreme
Court in Butner14 said that you go to state law to determine whether
someone has an interest in property. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
went to Alabama law, and under Alabama conversion law, so says the
Eleventh Circuit, when property is repossessed, that divests the debtor
of a meaningful ownership interest. So the court is quite clever in
terms of Whiting Pools. Now, a lot of courts think that the Eleventh
Circuit is wrong. Nevertheless, the case is out there, and secured cred-
itors are making the Lewis argument everywhere.
MS. LIVINGSTON: What do you define as a "meaningful owner-
ship interest?"
MS. HILLINGER: Well, I do not think that the debtor in Whiting
Pools had a meaningful ownership interest. I do not consider the right
to notice of a tax sale, the right to surplus and the right to redeem
particularly meaningful. The Supreme Court said that, so long as a
debtor has those rights or some kind of ownership interest defined as
no prepetition sale to a third party, i.e., title to the property, the prop-
erty itself is property of the estate.
11. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 290 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2003), affd 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14950 (11th Cir. 2004).
12. In re Robinson, 285 B.R. 732 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002).
13. United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
14. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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MR. LEIPOLD: If secured creditors are able to repossess cars and
not have to turn them over, you have pretty much wiped out a whole
class of Chapter 13 debtors. Debtors without cars cannot make their
plan payments because they cannot get to their job and they cannot
get a new car. I thought Whiting Pools was really saying we need to
prevent this from basically upsetting the whole statutory scheme Con-
gress was trying to put into place.
MS. HILLINGER: Whiting Pools is policy driven and it does facili-
tate reorganization. A debtor, without its assets, cannot reorganize.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit did not buy that. Thank you.

